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Federal Injunctions and State Criminal
Prosecutions: Vestiges of "Our Federalism"
Bruce E. Gaynor*
I care not who makes th' laws iv a nation if I can get out an
injunction.
-Peter Finley Dunne, Mr. Dooley
on IRVYTHING and IRVYBODY 153.
INCREASINGLY OVER THE PAST DECADE,

persons charged with violations

of "unconstitutional"u federal or state statutes have sought to obtain
equitable relief in the federal courts. 2 Most often, the relief sought
has been in the form of an injunction restraining the government
from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute 3 under the allegedly
invalid statute.4 Declaratory relief (that the statute is, in fact, unconstitutional) has often been sought as an additional or alternative
remedy.5
While requests for federal injunctions to restrain federal prosecutions have posed few problems,6 attempts at obtaining federal injunctive relief against state court prosecutions have proved more troublesome.7 Basing their decisions on the two-hundred year old concept of
"Our Federalism,"s the federal district courts, and the United States
*B.S., Bowling Green University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State University
College of Law.
1 The contentions in this paper presume the existence of a good faith challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute. The issue is not the constitutionality itself, but rather the
propensity of the federal courts to intervene where a statute is invalid, or where it is
valid but applied unconstitutionally.
2 Injunctions against the enforcement of state and federal statutes may only be granted
by three-judge courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2282. Between 1963 and 1970, the number of
three-judge court hearings increased from 129 to 291, a change of 125.6%. REPORTs OF
THE PROCEEDINCS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER.ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 136

(1970). [hereinafter cited as JuDICIAL CONFERENCE.]
3 The term "prosecution" or "prosecute," should be interpreted generally so as to include
all stages of the criminal proceedings, from pre-arrest through the actual court proceedings. Though the different stages of the prosecution are critical in this paper, they
will be otherwise distinguished as "threatened" prosecution, "pending" prosecution, etc.
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2282 (1964).
5
See, e.g., Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (1968), rev'd 91 S. Ct. 74-6 (1971) where
declaratory relief was granted as "such other and further relief as to the Court may
seem just and proper."

642 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 201 (1969). See 28 U.S.C. § 2282, 2284 (1964).
7 See generally Carey, Federal Court Intervention in State Criminal Prosecutions, 56
MASS. L. Q. 11 (1971) ; Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, Forward: "Equal in
Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REV. 143 (1964) ; Comment, The Civil Rights Act as a Statutory
Exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, 4 JOHN MARSH. L. J. 55 (1970) ; Commentary,
The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,
5 GA. L. REV. 294 (1971) ; Federal Court Stays of State Court Proceedings: A Reexamination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CMI. L. REV. 612 (1971).
Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750 (1971). For historical definitions and commentaries on "federalism," see M.

1787, 34, 283, 301, 314, 331
REV. 586 (1967).

FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

(1966); Bell, Federalism in Current Perspective, 1 GA. L.
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Supreme Court, 9 have been loath to interfere with state court prosecutions,10 whether threatened or pending. 11
Much to the dismay of criminal defense and civil rights lawyers,' 2
the federal "hands-off" or abstention policy has become firmly entrenched in our system of jurisprudence.' 3 For a short time, though,
proponents of a liberal shift toward intervention had reason to be
optimistic. Their optimism was predicated on the 1965 decision in
Donzbrowski v. Pfister,14 which held that an injunction should properly
have been granted to restrain Louisiana state officials from prosecuting members of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc.,
(SCEF) an organization active in fostering civil rights in the South.
Perhaps as a result of Dornbrowski-based speculation, the number of
federal injunction applications in civil rights cases rose dramatically
in the period following that decision.' 5 From 1965 to 1970, the number of such applications in three-judge courts increased by over

500%.IG
On February 23, 1971, however, the Supreme Court laid all speculation to rest when it handed down a series of decisions "explaining"
Dombrowski.17 Younger v. Harris,i8 the leading case in that series,
reaffirmed the existence of a "national policy"' 9 against federal intervention, and confirmed the notions of many who had always felt that
the Donibrowski decision was a "bearded, one-eyed, red-haired, man
' 20
with a limp."
928 U.S.C. § 1253 provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of
three-judge courts.
1 See Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 91 S. Ct. 769 (1971)
Boyle v. Landry, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971) ; Perez
v. Ledesma. 91 S. Ct. 674 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 91 S. Ct. 777 (1971); Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) ; Douglas v.
City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) ; Williams v. Miller. 317 U.S. 599 (1942) ; Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) ; Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) ; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240
(1926).
11The distinction between threatened and pending is critical in federal injunction cases.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Nevertheless, it is safe to say that, in
either case, federal courts are reluctant to interfere.
12Most of the federal injunction applications have been in civil rights cases. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, $upra note 2, at 136.
13See cases cited note 10, supra.
14380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 136.

16Id.
17 See Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971) ; Dyson v. Stein, 91 S. Ct. 769 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971) ; Perez
v. Ledesma, 91 S. Ct. 674 (1971) ; Byrne v. Karalexis, 91 S. Ct. 777 (1971).
1091 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
19Id. at 749.
20Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dombrow,ski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535, 536 (1970).
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FEDERAL INJUNCTION OF STATE ACTION
History of Federal Intervention in State Court Prosecutions
The general rule that federal courts will not interfere with a
state's good-faith administration of its criminal laws 21 is rooted in
the very structure of federalist government:
Even the early colonialists, despite the sense of independence and
consequent concern with keeping government close to the people,
were compelled to recognize the inevitability of some federal
union. This tension between the desire for local government and
the necessity of federal power has never relinquished its
hold
22
over the American experiment in political organization.
The precarious balance between state and federal judicial systems has long been a source of major concern. Indeed, as early as
1787, Noah Webster wrote Benjamin Franklin that, "It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal courts will absorb the
judiciaries of the . . . states."22 Though fears of "absorption" have,
for the most part, been allayed, even Chief Justice Warren, addressing the American Law Institute in 1958, expressed concern over the
"proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state court
systems. ' 24 This sentiment has been perpetuated by Chief Justice
Burger who, on the matter of federal-state injunctions, commented
in 1970:
The friction in relations between state and federal courts presents
serious problems
in both the review of state prisoner petitions
25
and other cases.
Creation of the Hands-Off Policy: Pending v. Threatened Prosecutions
Anti-injunction law of 1971 is very much the result of two lines
of cases: (1) Those concerned with federal injunctions to stay "proceedings," or pending state court actions; and (2) those concerned with
restraining the institution of proceedings, or threatened state prosecutions.
1. Pending State Prosecutions (Proceedings)
The first court-oriented legislation in our country, the Judiciary
Act of 1789,26 contained no provision granting or restricting federal
use of injunctions against state actions. It is contended, however, that
the power to enjoin state proceedings was inherent in the federal
27
government..
Codification of the "hands-off" policy did not occur until 1793
when, in response to the sentiment expressed by some Jeffersonians,
21 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).

22 Introduction to SHVMAN, THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM 9 (1968).
23 p. L. FoRD, PAMPHLETS O THE ConwTrrrmoN 52-53 (1968).
24 Dyer, State Trial Courts from a Federal Viewpoint, 54 JUDICATURE 372, 374 (1971).
25 Id.

20 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
27Comment, tupra note 7, at S7.
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Congress enacted the first anti-injunction statute. 28 The ban of the law
was absolute:
[Nor] shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings
in any court of a state.2 9
Despite the broad prohibition, over a period of years the Supreme
Court promulgated several judicial exceptions to the rule. 30 The trend
continued until the 1941 case of Toucey v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 8' where Mr. Justice Frankfurter returned to a strict construction
of the law and delivered a majority opinion which effectually negated
all of the exceptions.
Advocates of federal abstention and the Supreme Court32 have
heralded the Act of 1793 as a "monument to the principle of independent state judicial systems." 31 Because of its constitutionally based
inception, state's rights espousers often point to the statute as evidence
of an historic national policy against intervention.3 4 With some exceptions, prompted by the decision in Toucey, the Act has been reenacted and exists today as 28 U.S.C. §2283. Still known as the "antiinjunction statute," §2283 has been interpreted as precluding federal
injunctive relief against pending state actions.3 5 Though interpretations
of the statute, and the statute itself, have been variously attacked,3 6
§2283 continues to serve, directly and indirectly,3 7 as a primary obstacle
to federal intervention.
§2283. Stay of State court proceedings
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect
or effectuate its judgments. [Emphasis added.] 38
2. Threatened State Prosecutions
Whereas §2283 exists as a preclusion against federal-state injunctions in pending state proceedings, there is no statutory prohibition
against federal injunctions against threatened state proceedings.
23 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22,

§ 5, 1 Stat. SSS.

29id.

v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S.
93 (1904); Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Providence & New York S. S.
Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250
(1874) ; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) ; Orton v. Smith, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 263 (1856) ; Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 178 (1807).
at 31 4 U.S. 138 (1941).
32
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
33 Federal Court Stayi, supra note 7, at 613.
4See Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750 (1971).
33Id.
38See Comment, supra note 7; Commentary, sutra note 7; Federal Court Stays, supra
note 7.
37It will be noted that although this section directly precludes intervention in pending
cases, it indirectly serves as supportive evidence of the national policy against intervention in other non-pending cases. That is, its constitutional origin is used as an
indication of "federalist feeling" at the time of our nation's founding.
38 28 U.S.C. 2283 (1964).
30 Kline
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In the 1908 case of Ex parte Young,'5 the Supreme Court opened
the door to federal injunctions to restrain threatened state prosecutions.
Justice Peckham, for the Court, promulgated that federal injunctions
may be granted where state officials:
[Threaten] and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil

or
criminal nature to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional
act, violating the Federal Constitution ....
[Emphasis
added.]40
Young was a "fountainhead;" 41 it opened the door to federal intervention, but made no effort to delimit its scope. In Fenner v. Boykin, 42 and
a line of associated cases, 43 the Court began to whittle the doctrine
down to a functional size. These cases, in toto, required the showing
of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate; 44 inadequate
remedy at law;' 5 the possibility of multiple suits;4 6 bad faith prose-

cutions; 47 and a "chilling effect" on constitutional rights.48 The culmination of the various limitations was the red herring, Dombrowski
49

v. pfister.

Appellant Dombrowski and two others were officers of SCEF,50
a civil rights organization in the South. In October, 1963, the appellants were arrested by Louisiana local and state police for alleged
5
violations of "Communist control laws." Police raided appellants'
homes and offices and seized, inter alia, Thoreau's Journal, membership lists and newspapers of SCEF, files and various correspondence.
The office was destroyed of its "capacity to function."'5 The chairman
of the State Un-American Activities Committee, Pfister, declared that
the arrests were made because of "racial agitation."' 3
Within a few weeks, a state judge quashed the indictments and
granted a motion to suppress the illegally seized evidence. Despite
the state court's disposition of the case, Pfister and his cohorts continued to threaten and harass the appellants with prosecution under
the statutes. These actions "paralyzed operations and threatened ex54
posure of the identity of adherents to a locally unpopular cause."
89209
U.S. 123 (1908).
4
0 rd. at 156.
41 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
42271 U.S. 240 (1926).
48 See cases cited note 10, supra.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.

48 Id.

49 380 U.S. 479 (1965).

50 Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. See text at note 14, supra.
51 Appellants were charged with violations of two Louisiana state laws: Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14.358 through 14.374
(Cum. Supp. 1962) ; and the Louisiana Communist Propaganda Control Law, LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 14.390 through 14.390.8 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
52380

U.S. 479 (1965).

53227 F. Supp. 556, 573 (1964), re'd, 380 U. S. 479 (1965).
04 $Q JS, 479, 438-489 (1965).
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Appellants brought an action under the Civil Rights Act5 5 but
the three-judge court denied an injunction to restrain appellees from
prosecuting or threatening to prosecute the SCEF officers. Relief was
denied because appellants:
[Did] not present a case of threatened irreparable injury to
federal rights which warranted cutting short the normal adjudication of constitutional defenses in the course of state criminal
prosecutions ....56
On direct appeal from the three-judge decision,5 7 the Supreme
Court, Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority, reversed. Recognizing
that federal interference is "peculiarly inconsistent with our federal
framework,"58 the court commented:
[But] the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which
defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a
substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur
if appellants must await the state court's disposition and ultimate
review in this Court of any adverse determination.
These allea59
tions, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.
In addition to finding irreparable injury, however, the Court recognized that the overbroad and sweeping vagaries of the statute would
impair freedom of expression, 60 and that a "chilling effect" might well
result from such a prosecution.0 1 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan
noted that the prosecutions were made in bad faith, without any real
intent to secure convictions 62 and that the statutes were, in fact, void
63
on their face.
After Dombrowski, the circuits were in conflict as to the real
meaning of that case. Were all of the Dormbrowski, elements necessary for federal injunctive relief, or only some of them? If so, which
of them? Even Justice Brennan, speaking in the later case of Younger
64
v. Harris,
noted that there were "some statements in the Dombrowski
opinion" which could lead one astray.65 Indeed, the three-judge court
in Younger granted an injunction against a pending case on the basis
of unconstitutionality on the face of the statute, without regard to
bad faith or harassment. 66
5 42 U.S.C. 9 1983 (1964).
51630 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
57Sultra note 9.
58380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
'9Id. at 485-486.
60 Id. at 585-489.
'1Id. at 487-489.
62 Id. at 490.
63 Id. at 497-498.
6491 S. Ct. 746 (1971).

,Id. at 753.
e6Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (1968), req'Vd, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
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The State of the Law After Younger v. Harris
It is safe to say that, after Younger at least, no federal-state in67
junction will be granted unless special circumstances can be shown.
In any case, whether the target of the injunction is a threatened or
pending action, constitutional rights must be involved. 68 In addition,
it is helpful if the constitutional rights in danger are some of the "more
9
important" ones; that is, first amendment rights.6
The normal prerequisites to equitable relief must also be present,
including an inadequate remedy at law and irreparable injury. 70 The
irreparable harm must be both great and immediate,7 1 or relief will
not be granted; and it must be other than that "incidental to every
criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith. ' 72 In other
73
words, there must be bad faith or harassment.
Additionally, there must be a threat of multiplicity of suits:
The threat to federally protected rights must be one that cannot
7
be eliminated by defense against a single criminal prosecution. '
75
Finally, unconstitutionality of the statute "on its face" is required,
though such unconstitutionality alone is not of itself sufficient to
76
justify relief.
Though neither "chilling effect" nor unconstitutionality on the
face of the statute will alone justify federal relief, it was stated in
Younger that:
There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which
the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in77 absence
of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.
Though the Court was definite as to the possible existence of such
circumstances, it was reticent as to what they might be. 78 It does
seem clear, however, that where the "chilling effect" operates on
79
first amendment rights, the odds of success will be greater.
Where the prosecution sought to be enjoined is not a pending one,
persons seeking a federal-state injunction may invoke 42 U.S.C. §1983
(the Civil Rights Act) and 28 U.S.C. §2281, 2284. The Civil Rights Act
provides that:
67 See cases cited note 10 supra.
687d.
69See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 4-79 (1965).
78Id.
71 Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
z-°Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
TS Id.
4

7 Id. at 751.
7'Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 470 (1965).
,6 Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 755 (1971).
,7Id.
78 Id.
79See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. -79 (1965).
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§1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. [Emphasis
added.]8 0
Thus, one who has met the requirements for injunctive relief as set
forth above will have standing to file a §1983 action.
Section 228181 provides for the convening of a three-judge court
to 'grant injunctions to restrain the institution of state actions, and
82
§2284 contains the procedures for three-judge courts.
Where the prosecution sought to be enjoined is pending, the procedural impediments are much greater. As mentioned supra, the
anti-injunction statute8" prohibits federal-state injunctions in such
cases. The only real consideration is whether the case falls within
one of the legislative exceptions to §2283.
The exceptions are three: (1) where expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, (2) where necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction
and (3) where necessary to protect or effectuate the court's judgments.8 4
. In recent years, the most controversial of these exceptions has
been the: first. The question posed by jurists,8 5 and as yet unresolved
by the Supreme Court, is whether the Civil Rights Act 86 falls within
the first category of exceptions. On this issue, the Supreme Court
has consistently been reticent. As late as 1971, the Court avoided
coming to grips with the issue:
Because our holding rests on the absence of factors necessary
under equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have
no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S.C. §2283, which prohibits
an injunction against state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" would in87and of itself be
controlling under the circumstances of this case.
80 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
81 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provides: An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any
officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made
by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality
of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district
court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
8228 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
83 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
84 Id.
85 Supra note 37.
80642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
87 Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 755 (1971).
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As to this issue, the district courts have arrived at varying answers.
Unfortunately, the series of cases handed down with Younger early
in 1971 have provided no resolution.
At least Mr. Justice Douglas has supported the incorporation of
§1983 as an exception to §2283.88 In balancing the interests of states
versus the constitutional rights of individuals, Mr. Justice Douglas
has concluded:
In times of repression, when interests with powerful spokesmen
generate symbolic pogroms against nonconformists, the federal
judiciary, charged by Congress with special vigilance for protection of civil rights, has special responsibilities
to prevent an
89
erosion of the individual's constitutional rights.
In response to the diatribes that federal-state injunctions are
violative of our notions of federalism, Justice Douglas commented:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute
dealing with federalism [the anti-injunction statute] passed at
the end of the 18th century to control another statute [the Civil
Rights Act] also dealing with federalism, passed almost 80 years
later, than to conclude that the early concepts federalism were
not changed by the Civil War. 90
Whether or not §1983 will act as an independent bar to relief
against pending actions, however, remains an open question. While
superficially it would appear that the only resolution can be a judicial
interpretation of the statute, there is yet another possibility-a judicially-created exception to §2283, independent of §1983.
Some support for this contention is garnered from the example in
Leitner Minerals, Inc. v. United States,91 where the Court judicially

created such an exception. In addition, language in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, in Perez v. Ledesma,92 is compelling:
Taken together, the principles of Ex parte Young and Dotmbrowski,

establish that whether a particular case is appropriate for federal
intervention depends both on whether a state proceeding is
pending and on the ground asserted for intervention. Where the
ground is bad faith harassment, intervention is justified whether
or not a state prosecution is pending. [Emphasis added.] 9

Immediately prior thereto, Mr. Justice Brennan recognized the existence of the §2283 bar to relief but commented that Dombrowski stood
for the principles that bad faith and harassment constitute "exceptional circumstances." 9' It is contended that this concept is not inconsistent with the opinion of the Court. 95
88ld. at 762-763.
-9Id. at 760-761.
90M. at 762-763.
91 3 5 2 U.S. 720 (1957).

-929 1 S.Ct. 674 (1971).
93 Id. at 694.
94Id. at 693.
95See Carey, supra note 7, at 31.
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Thus it appears that there may be two avenues to obtaining
federal injunctive relief, despite the §2283 ban: (1) the incorporation
of §1983 into the legislative exceptions; and (2) the judicial creation
of "exceptional circumstance" exceptions. Either course, however, is
highly volatile at this time. Hopefully, the Court or Congress will
attend to a clarification in the near future.
Conclusion
The question, whether federal courts should intervene in state
criminal prosecutions, is a matter of balance. On the one hand are
considerations of federalism and a national policy against federal
interference. On the other hand is an ever-increasing vocalization of
individual rights and a charge to the federal courts to protect those
rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the past few years, a new element has been added which
merits consideration. In the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States,9 6 it was noted that three-judge court applications for
injunctive relief against state prosecutions are tying up the federal
courts. Though this consideration should in no way be determinative
on the question of intervention, it may well be an influential factor.
In any case, the current state of the law is seemingly well
imbedded in notions of federalism, comity and "national policy."
Despite the grim outlook for interventionists, however, §1983 and the
"exceptional circumstance" viewpoint remain as a source of optimism.
Though the Court has avoided coming to grips with these problems,
its deference does not necessarily mean that it will not someday find
"exceptions" to §2283. For the present, it will suffice to say that the
vestiges of federalism are alive and well in the §2283 anti-injunction
act.
96

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 78.
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